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COMMENTS
THE TRUST DOCTRINE: A SOURCE OF
PROTECTION FOR NATIVE AMERICAN
SACRED SITES
Sacred sites constitute an integral part of Native American' indigenous
religion.2 In the past, Native Americans have challenged encroachment on
these sites by relying on the free exercise clause of the first amendment.3
1. Throughout this Comment, the terms "native," "Native American," and "tribe" are
used interchangeably. Each term refers generally to Native American tribes.
2. Native American religions are highly diverse and difficult to generalize accurately.
Nonetheless, certain commonalities exist among all indigenous North American cultures. 10
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 526, 526 (1987) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]. Typically,
Native Americans practice site-specific religions, attaching religious significance to the particu-
lar site where an event occurred, rather than to the event itself. A. HULTKRANTZ, BELIEF
AND WORSHIP IN NORTH AMERICA 126 (1981). In native heritage, sacred land can neither be
divided nor sold. OUR BROTHER'S KEEPER: THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMERICA 107-09 (E.
Cahn ed. 1961). At these sites, natives use "vision quests" to establish communication with
the spirits and gods of their religions. R. UNDERHILL, RED MAN'S RELIGION 96-97 (1965).
After these visions, the communicator receives spiritual rejuvenation and enhanced survival
skills. Id. at 97-99. Believers obtain visions after a period of fasting and self-sacrifice. Id. at
97. Young native boys, when denied the opportunity to conduct vision quests, become laconic
and unmotivated. Id. at 98-99. Vision quests constitute an integral part of Native American
survival in the world today. Id. at 96-105. In order to conduct successful quests, the practicing
native needs complete isolation and serenity. See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra, at 528.
In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986),
rev'd sub noma. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988),
the government appealed an injunction granted by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 552 F.
Supp. 951 (N.D.Cal. 1982). The district court enjoined the government from constructing a
road that would run through a group of sacred sites on the grounds that such a desecration
would violate the natives' first amendment right to free exercise of religion. In affirming the
injunction, the circuit court noted the importance of complete serenity to the continued use of
the area by the particular tribes involved. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 692. In doing so, the court
accepted the tribes' assertions that serenity was essential to the site's use, thus lending support
to the natives' claims that desecration of the sites would virtually prohibit them from practic-
ing their religion. The Supreme Court eventually vacated that portion of the Ninth Circuit's
opinion. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1321. The Court declined to find a free exercise clause violation,
id. at 1324-27, but did not deny the importance of serenity to the continued vitality of the area
as a sacred site. Id. at 1326.
3. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (government's granting of
private permits to expand a ski area located near a sacred site challenged as violative of free
exercise clause), cert. denied. 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th
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Invariably, those challenges failed.4 Given the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective As-
sociation,5 the free exercise clause appears an ineffective legal theory upon
which Native Americans may seek protection of their sacred sites.6
Native American tribes possess a unique relationship with the United
States government.7 The courts characterize the relation as that of a trust,
casting the Federal Government in the role of the Native Americans' protec-
tor.' The "trust doctrine," which imposes a fiduciary duty on the Federal
Government,9 provides Native Americans with a means of challenging gov-
Cir. 1980) (Navajo challenged government's operation of lake surrounding Rainbow Bridge
National Park in order to restrict public access on grounds of first amendment free exercise
rights), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth. (TVA), 620
F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.) (proposed operation of dam challenged as violative of first amendment),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706
F.2d 856 (8th Cir.) (government's regulation of access to sacred site challenged as violative of
first amendment), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
4. See Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744; Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176-80; Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165;
Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 794.
5. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
6. See id. at 1327 ("[G]overnment could simply not operate if it were required to satisfy
every citizen's religious needs and desires."). The site involved in Lyng fell within the geo-
graphic boundaries of government property. Id. at 1320. Thousands of other sites are simi-
larly situated. See also, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 228 (C.
Wilkinson & R. Strickland 1982 ed.) [hereinafter 1982 HANDBOOK]. Because of the great
number of sites potentially affected by this decision, the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Lyng is significant. Because the sacred site was located within government boundaries,
the Court characterized the government action as a government land use decision involving
the government's own property. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1327. Consequently, the Court precluded
application of the "compelling state interest test." Id. at 1324.
The "compelling state interest" test represents the strictest standard of review employed by
the Court for evaluating state action. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 530-31 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. When the
Court applies this test, the government must establish a "compelling" or "overriding" purpose
that the proposed action will advance, "one which justifies the limitation of fundamental con-
stitutional values." Id. at 530. Very few governmental interests will survive such review by the
Court. Id. at 530-31.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980) (federal government
acts as guardian for native interests); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 408
(1968) (tribal properties to be held in trust by the Federal Government); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886) ("The Indian tribes are the wards of the nation."); Chero-
kee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) (first characterization of tribes as possess-
ing a unique relationship with the Federal Government).
8. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
51-5, 560-62 (1830) (federal government's position as guardian requires it to protect tribal sov-
ereignty), overruled on other grounds, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
9. A. SCOTT, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 170 (1960); see Joint Tribal
Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 375 (1st Cir. 1975); Chambers,
Judicial Enforcement of Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1213-
14 (1975). Despite the distinct differences between a trust relationship and a ward-guardian
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ernment action which violates this duty.' 0 This doctrine presents interesting
implications for securing sacred site protection, including whether the gov-
ernment's fiduciary duty requires it to safeguard such sites."
This Comment proposes that the trust doctrine includes a duty to protect
Native American sacred sites. First, this Comment will examine the judicial
origins of and developments in the trust doctrine. Second, it will define the
scope of the doctrine by exploring legislatively and judicially created rights
secured to Native Americans through the trust doctrine. Next, this Com-
ment will show that, because sacred sites constitute an essential part of Na-
tive American life, sacred sites resemble those property rights that the trust
doctrine protected in the past. Thus, this Comment will conclude that the
trust doctrine constitutes a source of protection for Native American sacred
sites.
relationship, these terms are used interchangeably in federal Indian law. See, e.g., W. CANBY,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 34-35 (2d ed. 1988) (In describing the relationship,
"trust relationship" and "ward-guardian" are used interchangeably). [The author notes that
one would not normally cite to a nutshell as scholarly authority, but the area of federal Native
American law lacks a current treatise and handbook beyond the 1982 revision of Felix Cohen's
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW. See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6. Judge Canby's
nutshell fills this scholarly void and is accepted by writers in the field as a substantive work
worthy of citation. See generally Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Federal Indian Law, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1989) (Canby's nutshell presents developments in the law as "intellectual
problems," not merely "dry legal rules" and fills a gap in scholarly material available in the
area.)]
It is difficult to define, at this point, exactly what the fiduciary duty owed Native Americans
by the United States requires the government to do. This Comment will explore the scope of
the duty and examine the issue of whether the duty can be expanded to areas historically not
protected.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (trust doctrine used to
protect property rights); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (trust doc-
trine used to protect hunting and fishing rights); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S.
286 (1942) (trust doctrine used to protect income from property); United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935) (trust doctrine used to protect property rights); Lane v. Pueblo of
Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919) (same); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v.
Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975) (same); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F.
Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972) (trust doctrine used to protect water rights). But see Nevada v.
United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983) (limiting Pyramid Lake's effect).
11. If the trust doctrine does secure such protection, it must extend to sacred sites located
both on and off reservation land, just as hunting and fishing rights extend both on and off
reservation land. See W. CANBY, supra note 9, at 296-98. To do otherwise would, at best, be a
hollow victory. A decision only protecting sacred sites located on reservations would result in
virtually no protection against state action that desecrates sites located on public land. This is
precisely the danger Native Americans seek to protect themselves against because of the vast
number of sites located on public land. See Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1320 (thousands of sites fall
within public property).
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I. BIRTH OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE: THE CHEROKEE CASES
In 1831, the Supreme Court first suggested the existence of a trust rela-
tionship between the United States and Native Americans in Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia. 12 Cherokee Nation presented a constitutional challenge to
Georgia's attempt to extend its state laws to residents of the Cherokee reser-
vation. 13 The Cherokee brought the case directly to the Supreme Court
under the Court's grant of original jurisdiction, asserting that the dispute
arose between a state and a foreign state.' 4 The suit presented the issue of
whether the Cherokee tribe constituted a foreign state under article III of the
Constitution. 15
Chief Justice Marshall's majority opinion concluded that the Cherokee
did not constitute a foreign state.' 6 Although Chief Justice Marshall recog-
nized that the Cherokee's sovereignty resembled that of a foreign state, he
distinguished Cherokee sovereignty from that possessed by a foreign nation
because the tribe existed completely within the geographic borders of the
United States. 7 Rather, the Court characterized the Cherokee as "a domes-
tic dependent nation ... in a state of pupilage ...[t]heir relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."18 Because of this
12. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id. at 15-16.
15. Article III, § 2 of the Constitution, at the time of Cherokee, (before passage of the
Eleventh Amendment) provided that:
The judicial Power of the Supreme Court shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made under their authority; . . . -to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a party; -to Controversies between two or more states;
-between a State and Citizens of another State; -between Citizens of different States;
• .. and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
In all Cases ... in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
If the Cherokee tribe qualified as a foreign state, then it could bring its dispute directly to the
Supreme Court under the Court's grant of original jurisdiction. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) at 15-16.
16. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17, 20.
17. Id. at 19-20.
18. Id. at 17. The Court reached this conclusion by relying on Native Americans' accept-




characterization, the Court held the action outside the Court's grant of origi-
nal jurisdiction.19
Curiously, however, the Chief Justice did not relate the trust principle to
any specific creating document.2" Generally, a trust does not arise unless,
among other requirements, both a creating instrument and a present declara-
tion of an intent to create the trust exist.21 Because those elements were
lacking in Cherokee Nation, the Court did not delineate a private, express
trust.
Chief Justice Marshall looked to the Constitution's general treatment of
Native Americans22 and the broad scheme of both the Hopewell Treaty,23
which established relations between the Cherokee and the United States, and
other existing treaties.24 He noted that the treaties both granted the Chero-
kee the right to live in their territory uninterrupted by United States' citizens
and acknowledged the Cherokee's right to protection from the Federal Gov-
ernment.25 Furthermore, the Constitution's structure implied that Native
American tribes were separate entities from the newly formed United
States.26 Accordingly, Chief Justice Marshall characterized the Cherokee as
"a distinct political society ... capable of managing its own affairs and gov-
erning itself."27 In broad terms, Cherokee Nation articulates the proposition
that the United States owes duties to Native American tribes arising out of a
special relationship between the two entities.28
19. Id. at 20.
20. See id. at 17-20. Though Chief Justice Marshall generally looked to the Constitution,
id. at 18, and the treaties, id. at 17, those documents provided guidance, but were not control-
ling. See id. at 17-20.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 23 (1959).
22. The Constitution, at that time, treated Native American individuals and tribes as sep-
arate from the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (representation only to include
taxed "Indians"); id. § 8, cl. 3 (regulate commerce with the "Indian Tribes"). Thus, there
appeared no question that the framers intended to treat the natives separately from those con-
sidered full citizens. While the Chief Justice did not find the constitutional argument persua-
sive enough to support the assertion that the Cherokee possessed the status of a foreign state, it
most definitely implied that the native nations retained some form of sovereignty. See infra
text accompanying notes 25-28.
23. Hopewell Treaty (Treaty with the Cherokee), 7 Stat. 18 (Nov. 28, 1785).
24. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
25. Id.
26. See supra note 22.
27. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
28. Id. at 17; see also W. CANBY, supra note 9, at 34-35; Chambers, supra note 9, at 1215-
16; Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 195, 204 (1984); Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 422 (1984).
Reid Peyton Chambers, former Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs for the United States
Interior Department, advances two interpretations for Chief Justice Marshall's conclusion in
19891
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In Worcester v. Georgia,29 Chief Justice Marshall further elaborated on the
nature of the trust relationship.3" The Court stated that although the Chero-
kee, through treaty, acknowledged themselves to be under the protection of
the United States, "protection" did not imply destruction of the weaker na-
tion.3" The treaties of the United States define the "Indians" as a separate
nation with whom only the Federal Government could negotiate.3" The
Court considered the Cherokee a "distinct community occupying its own...
territories."33 Hence, Georgia's jurisdiction could not penetrate the borders
of the Cherokee Nation.34
In defining the Cherokee as a distinct nation, the Court clarified its posi-
tion in Cherokee Nation. 35 In Cherokee Nation the Court relied on the Con-
stitution, the treaties with native tribes, and the laws enacted under the
Indian Commerce Clause as establishing the Native American tribes as a
separate nation.36 But Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning did not definitively
dispel the concurring Justices' notions37 in Cherokee Nation that the treaties,
although entered into with a tribal sovereign, extinguished the Cherokee's
Cherokee Nation. See Chambers, supra note 9, at 1220. One could view the trust doctrine as
merely a facade, arising out of the treaties and statutes governing the relationship between the
specific tribe and the government. Id. Such an interpretation, from the Native Americans'
point of view, stands on shaky theoretical grounds because the destruction of the treaty or
repeal of the statute could mean the end of the trust relationship. Id. at 1221. An alternative
interpretation places Chief Justice Marshall's trust doctrine on the foundation of inherent pow-
ers of tribal sovereignty. Id. The treaties between the federal government and the tribes illus-
trate the government's ratification of that tribal sovereignty. Under this interpretation, the
tribe's sovereignty survives beyond the abrogation of the treaty or repealment of the statute.
Id. Narrow explanations, such as tying the trust doctrine to the existence and terms of spe-
cific treaties, do not withstand scrutiny when one considers that the doctrine endures even
today, see Note, supra, at 424 n. 16, despite the fact that no new treaties have been entered into
since 1871. See The Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566
(current version at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)) (outlawing the making of treaties with the Native
American Nations).
29. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), overruled on other grounds, Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). In Worcester, the Court had jurisdiction because the case was
brought by a non-native missionary challenging Georgia's law banning non-natives from the
reservation as violating the Constitution and treaties with the Cherokee. Id. at 537-41.
30. Id. at 554-63. Though Cherokee Nation laid the foundation for the trust doctrine, the
new relationship called for a greater elaboration.
31. Id. at 551-52, 561. The concurrences in Cherokee Nation argued that the treaties
entered into with the United States compromised the Cherokee's sovereignty. See Cherokee
Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 26-27 (Johnson, J., concurring) and 38-40 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
32. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 560.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 12-29.
36. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-20 (1831).
37. See id. at 25-26, 34 (Justices Johnson and Baldwin each wrote a separate concurring
opinion); id. at 25-26 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 34 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
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sovereignty.3" In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall looked to the charters
creating the colonies and noted that the colonists intended to "civilize" the
natives, not exterminate them.3 9 Likewise, he found that the Hopewell
Treaty, and those that followed, guaranteed the Cherokee Federal Govern-
ment protection, but did not implicitly destroy the Cherokee's sovereignty.4"
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the Federal Government's role as
trustee included an obligation to ensure the Cherokee their land and sover-
eignty, subject to negotiated cessations and liabilities." The trusteeship role
also encompassed government protection of the Native Americans' right to
self-government from state encroachment.42 Thus, the Supreme Court, in
Worcester, dismissed the argument by those concurring in Cherokee Nation
that the Native American tribes stood as a conquered nation43 and empha-
sized the natives' right both to their aboriginal lands and to self-
government."
Taken together, the "Cherokee cases"4 5 establish the trust relationship be-
tween the United States and the Native Americans.46 The decisions recog-
nize the Native American nations as domestic sovereigns within the
jurisdiction of the Federal Government and the boundaries of the United
States.47 The Cherokee cases permit only the Federal Government to negoti-
38. Id. at 26, 38. Justices Johnson and Baldwin, in their concurring opinions, character-
ized the relationship as one between a conquering nation and a subject people. Both Justices
looked to the Treaty of Hopewell in 1785, which received the Cherokee into the protection of
the United States, and concluded that the treaty represented the Cherokee's acknowledgement
of their dependent character. See id. at 26-27, 38-40; see also Chambers, supra note 9, at 1216
n.21. Chief Justice Marshall rejected this theory in Worcester. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at
551-54.
39. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 546. Chief Justice Marshall looked beyond the relation-
ship between the colonies and the Native Americans to the relations between Britain and the
natives. Id. at 546-48. Finding that relation to be one of "powerful friend and neighbor," he
concluded that the same role was imparted on the United States when the colonies broke from
British control. Id. at 552.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 555-56, 560-62.
42. Id. at 561.
43. See id. at 549-53, 560-61; cf Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 26-27,
38-40 (1831) (concurring justices characterizing natives as a conquered people by virtue of
their acceptance of federal government protection secured to them through treaty).
44. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560.
45. The "Cherokee cases" include Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)
and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), overruled on other grounds, Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). See generally Burke, The Cherokee Cases, A
Study of Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969) (general discussion of
Cherokee cases).
46. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 9, at 1215-16; Newton, supra note 28, at 204.
47. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560-61.
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ate with and exercise jurisdiction over the tribal nations.4" Furthermore, the
Cherokee cases impart a trusteeship to the Federal Government to ensure
that the states do not encroach upon the natives' land base and tribal right to
self-government.49 Thus, these cases define the original parameters of the
trust doctrine.
II. THE TRUST DOCTRINE AFTER CHEROKEE. THE EMERGENCE OF A
PATERNALISTIC GOVERNMENT
After Chief Justice Marshall's Cherokee decisions, the trust doctrine
swung full circle. Subsequent to establishing the trust relationship in the
Cherokee cases,5" the Court departed from the notion that government
should ensure tribal autonomy and sovereignty.5" It adopted a characteriza-
tion of Native American tribes as helpless and dependent nations.52 Fifty
years after the Cherokee cases, the Court affirmed Congress' self-assumed
broad legislative powers over native affairs by deferring to congressional pol-
icy judgments.5 3 This trend began in 1886"4 and continued unabated until
1919,"5 when the Court resumed limited judicial review of congressional and
executive actions.5 6 Not until 1980 did the Court reject its holdings of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century57 regarding broad, unchecked
congressional and executive power over Native American affairs.5 8 The de-
gree to which the Court deferred to federal legislation mirrored the contem-
poraneous levels of political hostility toward the tribes.59 Hence, an effective
examination of the trust doctrine's evolution necessarily entails an evalua-
tion of the country's corresponding political tides.
48. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561-63.
49. Id. at 561.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 12-49.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 69-102; see also Chambers, supra note 9, at 1225.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39-41 (1913) (Native American char-
acterized as simple, uninformed, inferior people); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383
(1886) (Native Americans' status as "wards" supports extension of federal criminal jurisdic-
tion to reservation members).
53. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-
85.
54. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 375.
55. See Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919) (disposing of tribal land
under public land laws would be an act of confiscation, not guardianship).
56. Id.
57. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 412-15 (1980).
58. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-85.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 61-102.
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A. The Trust Doctrine During the Allotment Era (1871-1928) 60
In the Appropriations Act of 1871, Congress outlawed the practice of en-
tering into treaties with the natives.6 ' In the years immediately preceding
this action, substantial numbers of white settlers commenced the westward
expansion.62 These settlers, craving title to the Native Americans' vast land
holdings, unavoidably clashed with the Native American tribes.63 To satisfy
the resulting political demand, Congress pursued courses of action designed
to eventually pass title of Native American land to the new western
settlers.64
To achieve this end, Congress formulated a plan involving both long and
short term goals. In the short term, Congress sought to confine the Native
Americans to their reservation land. By confining the natives to their reser-
vation land and allotting each individual tribe member a parcel of land, Con-
gress hoped to eventually reduce the total native land stock. White society
viewed native tribal customs, which stressed communal property ownership,
as a barrier to assimilating the Native Americans into western culture's pri-
vate property system.65 Confinement also helped facilitate Congress' long
term goal of assimilating the Native American into western culture. Con-
gress pursued this goal by introducing the natives to the private property
system while also educating them, both religiously and socially. These prac-
tices weakened Native American morale, thus contributing to the weakening
of the Native American nation's sovereignty. 66 Accordingly, Congress pur-
sued far reaching legislation designed to eliminate Native American commu-
nal property customs. 67  Congress ceased using treaties as the mode of
negotiation, and moved toward a goal of ridding America of all vestiges of
tribal sovereignty.
68
60. See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 127. The "Allotment Era" approximately
spanned the years 1871 to 1928. Newton, supra note 28, at 207. The Allotment Era in
American policy officially began with passage of the Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887,
General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 354, 381 (1982)), facilitating the breakup of tribal
reservation land through transfers or "allotments" to individual tribe members. The Act only
authorized allotments to individual natives and cessation of the "surplus" to the government.
Id. § 331. Under the Allotment Act, all reservation land deemed "surplus," after allotting up
to 160 acres per tribe member depending on its intended use, was to be surrendered to the
government for the public domain or for sale to a homesteader. Id.
61. Ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (1871) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1982)).
62. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 128.
63. Id. at 128, 132.
64. Id. at 128-39.
65. Id. at 128-29.
66. F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 673 (1984).
67. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 130-34.
68. Id.
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The Supreme Court's holdings during the Allotment Era69 reflected con-
gressional and popular sentiments.7 ° In two major decisions, United States
v. Kagama7 ' and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,72 the Court affirmed major legis-
lative actions affecting Native Americans. 73 These decisions indicated that
the Court would not interfere with congressional goals.74 In addition, the
Kagama and Lone Wolf decisions significantly diminished tribal sovereignty
by approving Congress' professed goals of allotment, which reduced the total
native land stock, 75 and assimilation, which demoralized the Native Ameri-
can nation.76
In United States v. Kagama, 7 7 the Court validated the Major Crimes Act 78
which extended federal criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans within
reservations. 79 In Kagama, the Court relied on its opinion in Cherokee Na-
tion v. Georgia,80 describing the Native Americans as the "wards of the na-
tion," t to significantly circumscribe the scope of tribal sovereignty. 82 The
Court reasoned that, as wards, the natives virtually depended on the Federal
Government for their existence. 83 Furthermore, the Court viewed the Major
Crimes Act as a manifestation of the government's "duty of protection" aris-
ing from the Native Americans' status as a helpless, weak community. 84 In
addition, it viewed extension of federal criminal jurisdiction as a natural con-
sequence of the Native American tribes' existence within the United States'
borders.85 Thus, the Court implicitly rejected the notion of dual sover-
69. See supra note 60.
70. Cf United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) ("[P]ower of the General
Government over [the natives] . . . is necessary to their protection."). See generally 1982
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 128 (assimilation theory used to justify legislation as beneficial to
Native Americans).
71. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
72. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
73. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84; Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 566-68.
74. See Newton, supra note 28, at 222.
75. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 128-38. After each tribe member received his allot-
ment portion, the excess was either retained by the government or sold to western settlers. See
also supra note 60 (explaining allotment system).
76. F. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 671-73; see also Chambers, supra note 9, at 1225-27
(discussing the general effect of Kagama and Lone Wolf as destroying the inherent powers of
tribal self-government).
77. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
78. Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 385 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982)).
79. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 385.
80. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
81. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383.
82. Id. at 383-84.
83. Id.




eignty. 8 Relying on the Appropriations Act of 1871 as Congress' rejection
of the concept of a domestic Native American nation, the Court in Kagama
concluded that the Major Crimes Act constituted a necessary element to the
government's execution of its duty as trustee of a "helpless nation. "87
The holding in Kagama implicitly rejected previous Supreme Court dic-
tum that rebuffed the characterization of the native tribes as conquered peo-
ples.88 The Cherokee cases established that the Federal, rather than the
State, Government could exercise jurisdiction over the native tribes.89 These
opinions also indicated that the Federal Government should preserve tribal
sovereignty.9" Kagama, though, acknowledged that through the course of
dealing with the Federal Government, the Native American tribes lost their
original independent qualities. 9 Moreover, Kagama affirmed Congress' pa-
ternalistic approach, represented by Congress' assimilation policies, by bas-
ing its holding on a broad reading of Congress' duty as trustee.92 Thus,
Kagama imposed no limits on Congress' authority as trustee, contrary to the
implications of Cherokee Nation 93 and Worcester. 
94
Judicial deference to congressional Native American policy continued
with the Supreme Court's decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.95 In Lone
Wolf several tribes challenged an allotment sale of surplus tribal land on the
ground that the government sold the land without the tribe's approval.96 In
arguably the Court's most explicit approval of turn of the century native
policy, the Court held that Congress' authority over Native American tribes
86. Id. at 381 ("They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent
position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as states, not as nations."). But see
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832) (Congress treats Native Americans
as distinct political communities), overruled on other grounds, Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
87. 118 U.S. at 384.
88. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 550-60; see also Chambers, supra note 9, at 1225.
89. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15-20; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at
561.
90. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15-20; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556-62.
91. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 381.
92. Id. at 383-84. By granting Congress broad authority over tribes, the Court afforded
Congress discretion over Native Americans. See supra note 6; infra note 97 (discussion of the
relationship between standard of i'eview and resulting deference to Congress and the Executive
branch). The Court affirmed Congress' actions despite the presence of a reasonable argument
that the Native Americans should not be subject to complete federal control. See Chambers,
supra note 9, at 1224.
93. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
94. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), overruled on other grounds, Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
95. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
96. Id.; see supra note 60.
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constituted a political question, and thus was not subject to judicial review.9 7
The Court's decision in Lone Wolf cleared the way for Congress to adopt a
paternalistic role, determining the Native American's future without regard
to the native's own interests.
The Court affirmed the right of Congress to unilaterally abrogate its trea-
ties with native tribes if Congress found the action in the best interests of
both the Native Americans and the United States.98 The Court also noted
that Congress' trusteeship allowed it to "change the form of Indian invest-
ment" from land to money without breaching its fiduciary duty.99 The
Court attached a presumption of good faith to Congress' dealings with Na-
tive Americans which restricted judicial examination of the adequacy of con-
sideration paid for tribal land.' 00 Thus, the Court removed the balance of
power that judicial review provided and freed Congress to determine the
natives' future as Congress saw fit.'' The Court implied that Native Ameri-
cans, ill-equipped to manage their own affairs, would benefit from congres-
sional management. o2
Precluding judicial review necessarily broadened Congress' ability, as
trustee, to pass legislation affecting the Native Americans. 1°3 Courts tradi-
tionally apply the political question doctrine when presented with a dispute
between coequal federal branches."o Presumably, the Constitution provides
necessary checks and balances between coequal branches of the Federal
Government.'0 5 If the Court finds no express limit within the Constitution,
the Court should defer to the decision of the corresponding branch.' 6 Like-
wise, when the dispute is between voters and Congress, the voting privilege
provides citizens with a mechanism by which to publicize its opinion of Con-
97. Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 565. The political question doctrine, or, as it may be more
properly called, the "doctrine of nonjusticiability," CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at
102, calls for judicial abstention when the issue is one "best resolved by the body politic." Id.
As a consequence of the political question doctrine, the government conduct complained of is
immune from judicial review. Id.
98. Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 566.
99. Id. at 568.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 566-68; see CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 102.
102. Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 566 (circumstances may arisewhich demand that Congress act
to preserve the best interest of Native Americans).
103. Supra note 97.
104. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 102-10 (discussing the applica-
tion of political question doctrine by the Supreme Court when faced with disputes which are
best resolved by the political process or where the particular constitutional power involved was
not granted completely to one branch of government).
105. Id. at 103.
106. See id. at 109.
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gress' actions. 10 7 However, at the time of the Lone Wolf decision, very few
Native Americans possessed the status of citizen, or the right to vote,0 8 and
thus lacked a meaningful tool by which to promote their interests.' 0 9 Ac-
cordingly, the Court's decision in Lone Wolf expanded Congress' trusteeship
powers by vesting Congress with the tools necessary to pursue an extremely
paternalistic approach towards those who lacked the usual corresponding
power to voice their opposition."' Together, Kagama and Lone Wolf en-
dowed Congress with a broad, paternalistic trusteeship. "' The Court's deci-
sions in these cases resulted in extreme judicial deference to Congress'
judgments. 12 The decisions also reflected the prevalent cultural prejudice
against Native Americans by casting them as helpless, dependent, and infer-
ior peoples." 3 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected assessments of Native
Americans as domestic sovereigns' 14 and subjected them to broad and virtu-
ally unchecked legislative powers." 5
B. The Road Back to Cherokee: 1930 to the Present 116
As the judicial interpretation of the trust doctrine in Kagama 117 and Lone
Wolf". 8 reflected the political atmosphere of the era, the political climate
similarly affected subsequent developments in the trust doctrine. In later
years,' '9 Native Americans experienced considerable progress in achieving
107. But see United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("discrete
and insular minorities" may not receive adequate representation in the political process).
108. Congress did not grant national citizenship to all Native Americans until 1924. See
Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (b) (1982)).
Though the Allotment Act created national citizenship in the affected tribes, it was not highly
successful and met with tribal hostility. F. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 681-86; see also supra
note 60.
109. F. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 681-86.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 95-109.
111. See Chambers, supra note 9, at 1225-27. Professor Chambers explains that together
Kagama and Lone Wolf deny the existence of any discernible limit on a federal official's power
to act when that official acts in the name of the Native Americans' "best interest." Id.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 77-109.
113. See Chambers, supra note 9, at 1225-26; see also Newton, supra note 28, at 218.
114. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 564 (1903).
115. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84; Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 565-66.
116. The courses of domestic policy break down as follows: Treaty Making, 1789-1871;
Allotment and Assimilation, 1871-1928; Indian Reorganization Act, 1928-42; Termination,
1943-61; Self-Determination, 1961-present. See generally 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at
47. One can split the developments of the trust doctrine more broadly into pre- and post-1930
developments. See Newton, supra note 28, at 207, 228.
117. 118 U.S. at 375.
118. 187 U.S. at 553.
119. Native Americans experienced the most progress in the thirties, forties, sixties, and
seventies. Congresses of the 1930's and 1940's produced the Indian Reorganization Act.
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judicial recognition of individual and tribal rights.' 2 ° In addition, an exami-
Wheeler-Howard [Indian Reorganization Act] Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982)). John Collier, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs under Franklin Roosevelt, and the driving force behind the Indian Reorganization Act,
F. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 957-68, believed strongly in the rights of Native Americans. The
Indian Reorganization Act reflected a solid break with the policies of the past. Id. at 954.
Many scholars consider Collier unsurpassed throughout history as the natives' friend, advo-
cate and government voice. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 146 (Collier's policy ideas
stressed preservation of native heritage and the encouragement of tribalism); B.W. DIPPIE,
THE VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ATTITUDES AND U.S. INDIAN POLICY 276 (1982) (John
Collier was the most dominant figure in Native American policy affairs.); K.R. PHILP, JOHN
COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM 1920-1954 244 (1977) (John Collier will always be
considered a "mover and shaker" of Native American history, a rare reformer); F. PRUCHA,
supra note 66, at 1012. The Indian Reorganization Act prohibited further individual allotment
of Indian lands, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1982); returned lands withdrawn for homesteads to tribal
use, id. § 463 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); authorized annual appropriations of funds for land
purposes, id. § 465; made mandatory conservation of tribal lands, see id. § 466 (sustained yield
practices are mandatory for reservation forests; rules and regulations may be promulgated as
become necessary to protect lands from deterioration); established a revolving credit fund for
the benefit of individual Natives and tribes, id. § 470; encouraged tribal self-government and
self-management of economic resources, id. § 469 (funds appropriated to defray costs of form-
ing native corporations); provided funds for educational loans, id. § 471; and gave Native
Americans a preference under Civil Service rules for employment in the Indian Service, id.
§ 472(a). See also 2 W. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 950-51 (report of John Collier, 1940).
The idealism that swept the country's politics in the 1960's found its way into tribal affairs
as well. 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 180-81; 2 W. WASHBURN, supra at 1000-12 (Re-
ports of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Philleo Nash, 1961-63). The final, and current, chap-
ter in the history of American policy encompasses the era of Self-Determination. 1982
HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 180-81. The name "self-determination" came about because it
reflected the major theme of current policy which stressed the Native Americans' ability and
right to determine their future for themselves. Id. Tribal self-determination grew out of a
respect for the tribal unit as an essential building block of self-government, as well as a new
social awareness for the crisis facing many ethnic minorities during that time. Id.; see also F.
PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 1088. Self-determination stressed tribal participation in policy
making decisions, signaling an end to the paternalism which pervaded past legislative schemes
and undermined social and economic growth of Native Americans. Id. at 1096-97.
120. For example, one goal of the Nixon Administration in fulfilling the promise of govern-
ment recognition of tribal rights entailed returning the Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo Tribe. F.
PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 1127. The Taos considered Blue Lake one of their sacred sites and
practiced many religious rituals at its banks. Id. See generally supra note 2 (Native Americans
who practice site specific religion depend on the preservation of sacred sites). President
Roosevelt transferred Blue Lake to the government making it part of the Carson National
Forest, thus ending the Natives' exclusive use of the Lake. F. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 1127.
By returning land, rather than granting money damages, the government indicated a renewed
respect for Native American culture. Id. In particular, the administration acknowledged the
need for native control of their ancestral land base. Id. The Nixon Administration did not
characterize the transfer of the 48,000 acres as a gift, but rather as a transfer of land rightfully
belonging to the Taos Pueblo. Id. During this time Congress returned significant amounts of
land to Native American tribes, 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 197, much of it considered
sacred by the tribes. The return of Blue Lake marked the first time the government recognized
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nation of judicial activity during these years reveals a gradual return to the
reasoning of the Cherokee cases.
121
1. First Steps: 1934 - 1968
In 1934, the Supreme Court took the first step 122 toward limiting the def-
erence afforded Congress in the past. In United States v. Creek Nation, 123
the Creek Tribe sued to recover the value of land erroneously ceded to the
Federal Government because of the government's inaccurate survey of the
boundary to Creek Nation land. 124 After the government appropriated the
land involved in the erroneous survey, the Creek instituted the action. The
government never disputed the misappropriation, but challenged the Creek's
valuation of the land. Because, although quite unusual for this time period,
the Creek held their land in fee, 125 the facts provided the Court a unique
opportunity to limit its past holdings. The Court acknowledged Congress'
power to manage Native American land, but did not characterize the power
as plenary. 126 The Court held Congress' power subject not only to the inher-
ent limitations in a trust relationship, but also to any pertinent constitutional
restrictions.127 By applying such limitations to Congress' power, the Court
began moving away from the expansive discretion previously conferred upon
Congress.
In Seminole Nation v. United States, 128 the Court retreated further from
the position that Congress retained plenary power over the Native Ameri-
cans.129 In Seminole Nation, the Court applied established principles of pri-
the importance of native control of aboriginal lands and made an effort to return those lands
to their original status. Id. at 198.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 122-86.
122. In 1919, the Court foreshadowed its future position in Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa,
249 U.S. 110 (1919). The Lane Court held that disposing of tribal lands under the public land
laws would be an act of confiscation, not guardianship. Id. at 113. Furthermore, it criticized
the Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), decision for viewing the guardianship rela-
tionship as an obstacle for tribes to overcome, rather than as an asset. Lane, 249 U.S. at 114.
The Native American did not make significant progress in eroding the restrictive holdings of
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (federal government's power over the
Native American tribes is necessary for the tribe's protection and the safety of those who live
near them), and Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 565 (Congress' plenary authority over the natives is a
political question not subject to judicial control), until 1934. See infra text accompanying
notes 125-30.
123. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
124. Id. at 106.
125. Id. at 109.
126. Id. at 109-10.
127. Id. at 110. The Court relied primarily on the holding of Lane v. Pueblo of Santa
Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919). See supra note 122.
128. 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
129. Id. at 296-97. The Court stated that Congress' conduct was subject to traditional
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vate trust law130 to hold the government liable for the actions of an
intermediary trustee.' 3 1 In this case, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
knowingly disbursed tribal funds held in trust for the Seminole Tribe to the
corrupt Tribal Council. 132 Because the government paid the funds to the
Council at the Council's request, the government contended it should be free
from liability. 133  The government maintained that its obligation ran, by
treaty, between itself and the Council, and that government liability would
result in double payments to the Council.1
34
The Court rejected this argument and applied established fiduciary princi-
ples to hold the government accountable to the beneficiary Seminole tribe
members.' 35 The Court based its holding on the maxim that a principal
fiduciary is liable for the actions of an intermediary fiduciary, if the principal
knows of the intermediary's wrongdoings.136  In short, Seminole Nation
makes the standards pertaining to a private fiduciary applicable to Congress.
Though a private express trust served as the focus for the litigation, this case
marked the first extension of traditional fiduciary principles to the Federal
Government, despite similar language marking government tribal relations
in the past.
Up to this point, the Court had moved towards rejecting Lone Wolf and
Kagama, yet had not explicitly renounced them. Not until 1968 did the
Court begin to directly limit those holdings.' 3 7 By 1980, the Court would
effectively overturn its past position. 138
2. The Turning Point: Menominee Tribe v. United States
In 1968, the Supreme Court, in Menominee Tribe v. United States, 13' di-
fiduciary standards which govern the actions of trustees. This is a significant departure from
the attitude expressed in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), which characterized
Congress' authority over Native Americans as plenary and beyond judicial control. Id. at 565.
130. Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296 (citing 4 G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES §§ 901,
955 (1935), and 3 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 321.1 (1939), and RESTATEMENT TRUSTS § 321
(1935)).
131. Id. at 296. The Tribal Council for the Seminole Nation acted as the intermediary
trustee. Id.
132. Id. at 295. The Dawes Commission, a government commission responsible for super-
vising the disbursement of the funds, fully documented the Council's corrupt nature. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 296; see supra note 130.
136. Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 139-44.
138. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); see infra text accompanying notes
161-70.
139. 391 U.S. 404 (1968)
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rectly limited its holding in Lone Wolf 140 In Menominee Tribe, the Court
confirmed Congress' right to unilaterally abrogate its treaties with Native
American tribes, 4  but Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, provided
that the Court would require explicit proof of congressional intent to termi-
nate or modify a treaty with the Native Americans.t41 Without explicit con-
gressional intent to change a treaty, the treaty would remain as originally
interpreted.' 4 3 Thus, by assigning to Congress the burden of showing clear
evidence of an intent to alter treaty rights, the Court decreased the signifi-
cance of Lone Wolf which previously afforded Congress virtually unlimited
discretion in its dealings with Native Americans.'
44
3. Progress in the Lower Courts
In 1973, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 145 imposed a strict fiduciary obliga-
tion on the executive branch 46 to protect Native American interests.' 47 In
Pyramid Lake, the court enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from divert-
ing water from a tribal lake to a nearby irrigation district until the Secretary
gave due consideration to the Paiute Tribe's interests. 48 The district court
imposed an expansive obligation on the executive branch to accommodate
the Tribe's interests.' 49 The court required the Secretary to liberally con-
strue his obligation to the Native Americans.' 5° Thus, by 1973 at least one
federal court had subjected the executive branch to broad limitations requir-
ing liberal protection of Native American interests.' 5 '
In 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Joint
140. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
141. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 412.
142. Id. at 413 (quoting Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Broom Co. v. Charles W. Cox
Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)); see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986)
(recent affirmation of the principle that the government must show clear evidence of an intent
to abrogate a treaty right).
143. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 413.
144. Id.
145. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).
146. Id. at 256.
147. Recently, in Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), the Supreme Court modi-
fied the scope of this duty by refusing to reopen the water rights decree when faced with a
renewed challenge by the Paiute Indians. Id. at 134-44. See infra note 210 for an analysis of
the impact of Nevada on future trust doctrine litigation.
148. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 256. In Nevada, the Supreme Court refused to reopen
the litigation on grounds of res judicata. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 130-34.
149. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 256.
150. Id.
151. Id. But see supra notes 147-148; infra note 210.
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Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 152 further extended the
Supreme Court's holding in Menominee Tribe. 153 In Passamaquoddy, the
Federal Government appealed from a declaratory judgment in the district
court which declared that the Tribe fell within the purview of the Non-Inter-
course Act,' 5 4 thus entitling the Tribe to federal protection.' 55 The court
held that the Non-Intercourse Act established a trust relationship between
all Native American tribes and the government.' 5 6 The court also estab-
lished a canon of construction for statutes or treaties relating to Native
Americans.' 5 7 The court held that such legal documents should be con-
strued "liberally [in favor of Native Americans] and in a non-technical sense,
as the Indians would naturally understand them."' 5 8 Thus, Passamaquoddy
built on the foundation laid by the Supreme Court in Menominee Tribe, 159
using the Non-Intercourse Act to establish the existence of a trust relation-
ship running from the government to all native tribes and providing a liberal
canon of construction in favor of Native Americans. Together, Pyramid
Lake 6 and Passamaquoddy indicated a substantial departure from the
Supreme Court's holdings in Lone Wolf and Kagama.
4. Rejection of Lone Wolf: United States v. Sioux Nation
Finally, in United States v. Sioux Nation, 161 the Supreme Court com-
pletely rejected Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. 162 As with United States v. Creek
Nation, 163 Sioux Nation involved a challenge to the price the government
paid for Native American reservation land. 164  The Court overturned Lone
Wolf on three different grounds. 165 First, the Court removed the presump-
152. 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
153. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
154. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982).
155. Passamaquoddy, 528 F.2d at 378. The Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982),
made invalid any land transaction entered into with a Native American tribe unless secured
through a United States treaty. Id. Thus, any native land transaction must include the federal
government as a party. Id.
156. Passamaquoddy, 528 F.2d at 379 (the Non-Intercourse Act statutorily created fiduci-
ary duties); see also, 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 7-9.
157. Passamaquoddy, 528 F.2d at 380.
158. Id.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 139-44.
160. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F.Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972). See infra note
210 and accompanying text (discussing validity of Pyramid Lake after the Supreme Court's
decision in Nevada).
161. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
162. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
163. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
164. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 374.
165. See id. at 412-13.
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tion of good faith which Lone Wolf attached to compensation paid by Con-
gress for Native American lands.' 66 Second, the Court held that federal
courts should engage in limited judicial review of congressional determina-
tions of the natives' best interests, by thoroughly and impartially examining
the historical record.' 67 Third, the Court held the political question doctrine
inapplicable to congressional relations with Native Americans. 168 Accord-
ingly, Sioux Nation summarily rejected Lone Wolf once again, by subjecting
congressional determinations to judicial review, and by removing the pre-
sumption of good faith that Lone Wolf attached to congressional actions.
The Court's holding in Sioux Nation inherently rejected governmental pa-
ternalism towards Native Americans. Lone Wolf placed federal native af-
fairs beyond the reach of the federal courts, thus essentially approving
Congress' role as the Native Americans' paternalistic guardian.' 69 By re-
jecting Lone Wolf's holdings, the Court also rejected Lone Wolf's result.
Sioux Nation brought Native American affairs back into a courtroom no
longer slanted towards Congress.'7 ° The Court's removal of the presump-
tion of good faith in connection with the compensation paid for native
land,171 together with the Court's decision to review Congress' determina-
tions, 172 effectively dispelled the notion that Congress could best determine
Native Americans' interests. Today, because Congress' authority is more
limited, and the government can no longer practice federal paternalism to-
wards Native Americans, the trust doctrine more closely resembles the con-
cept envisioned by Chief Justice Marshall in the Cherokee cases.' 73
Unfortunately, Sioux Nation does not guarantee that the Court will refrain
from substituting its judgment for the judgment of Congress, thereby prac-
ticing judicial paternalism.
174
166. Id. (relying on Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977)).
167. Id. at 413.
168. Id.
169. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 555-56 (1903) (Congress' dealings with Native
Americans constitute political questions, placing those dealings beyond broad judicial review).
See supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
170. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 413; supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text. Prior
to Sioux Nation, Congress historically enjoyed plenary power over Native Americans, with
which the Court chose not to interfere. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
Thus, Congress retained a judicial advantage over challenging Native Americans because
neither the natives nor the Court could question Congress' authority.
171. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 413.
172. Id.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 12-49.
174. See infra text accompanying note 239.
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III. RIGHTS SECURED THROUGH THE TRUST DOCTRINE'
75
Though the Supreme Court waffled on the trust doctrine issue,' 76 lower
federal courts applied the doctrine to secure for Native Americans basic land
rights such as the right to possession, 177 the right to receive income gener-
ated from the land, 178 the right to preserve water sources, 179 and the right to
175. One issue which potential trust doctrine litigants must address is how to state a cause
of action sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. After establishing subject matter
jurisdiction and a waiver of sovereign immunity, see Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian
Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 635, 636 n. 10 (1982) (subject matter
jurisdiction and sovereign immunity are now settled issues in federal Native American law), a
potential litigant must state a cause of action sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (listing grounds for motion to dismiss). In National Farmers Union Ins.
Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), the Supreme Court held that claims arising under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) include claims based on the federal common law in addition to the
Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States. Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 850. Native
American possessory rights based on aboriginal title are federal common law rights. County
of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 233-36 (1985). Furthermore, the right of
occupancy need not be based on treaty, statute or government action. Id. at 236. Although
the Supreme Court recently limited Native Americans' right to sue for monetary damages,
United States v. Mitchell 445 U.S. 535, 538-40 (1980) (Mitchell I), their right to sue for
equitable relief remains an open question. See Newton, supra, at 678-80. Therefore, a suit
seeking injunctive relief based on the federal common law right of occupancy should withstand
a motion to dismiss.
A suit for injunctive relief will adequately protect Native American interests, particularly
when one considers the unique and uncompensable nature of sacred sites, see supra note 2;
infra text accompanying notes 249-69, and the government's cost inherent in a monetary
judgment. An injunction will merely require the government to refrain from acting, thus
protecting the sacred site while avoiding the cost of a monetary judgment.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 122-73.
177. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923) (as the native tribes' guardian,
the United States could cancel land patents it issued to private third parties); Lane v. Pueblo
of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919) (enjoined Secretary of Interior from listing tribal lands as
part of public stock).
The Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315(r) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) superceded
Cramer's holding. In Cramer, the Supreme Court cancelled land patents previously issued to
the Central Pacific Railway Company because the patents issued failed to account for the
native's aboriginal title on the land that the natives used and cultivated. Cramer, 261 U.S. at
235-36. The Taylor Grazing Act makes it a policy of the United States to encourage grazing
on vacant public lands, 43 U.S.C. § 315, rather than encourage native settlement on such
lands, as was the policy in effect when the Court decided Cramer. Cramer, 261 U.S. at 233
(federal statute enacted to clear possession title to lands occupied by Native Americans). See
also United States v. Dann, Nos. 86-2835, 86-2890 (9th Cir. 1989) (LEXIS, 1989 U.S. App.
LEXIS 171, 22-25).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (compensation sought for
lands taken by the federal government which were secured to the Sioux through an earlier
treaty); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942) (funds paid in exchange for
land).
179. See, e.g., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972). But
see Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983). In Nevada, the Court refused to reopen the
water decree eventually secured as a result of the district court's decision in Pyramid Lake,
[Vol. 38:705
The Trust Doctrine
hunt and fish without state interference.' 8 ° Traditionally, the Court used the
trust doctrine only to secure rights mentioned either explicitly or implicitly
in past treaties, specific statutes, or agreements between native tribes and the
United States.' 8' In one case, though, the Supreme Court relied on the cul-
tural importance of tribal unity as a means of precluding de novo habeas
corpus review of tribal court decisions in federal court.' 82 Two recent
cases' 83 indicate that the federal courts may be abandoning the practice of
strictly reading creating documents to determine the rights reserved in those
documents. ' 84 Therefore, in order to discern the nature, scope, and dimen-
sion of the trust doctrine, one must scrutinize the rights Native Americans
previously secured through it. Only then can one attempt to make predic-
tions about the doctrine's future course.' 85
A. Real Property
Typically, courts secure tribal lands or income from land to Native Amer-
icans through the trust doctrine by using it to curtail government activity
that encroaches on tribal rights to property. ' 86 For many reasons, Native
Americans view land as their most important asset.' 87 Originally, Native
Americans exerted their tribal domain through their land holdings, 88 which
despite the fiduciary duty owed the Paiute by the Secretary of the Interior, because the decree
was subject to resjudicata considerations. Id. at 143.
180. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (hunting and fishing
rights); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974) (hunting rights); Leech Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp 1001 (D. Minn. 1971) (hunting and fishing
rights). But see United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (Congress can abrogate hunting
rights secured through treaty).
181. See Chambers, supra note 9, at 1214.
182. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 68-71 (1978) (tribe's right to define
membership is central to its existence as an independent community); see also F. PRUCHA,
supra note 66, at 1186-90.
183. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 404; White, 508 F.2d at 454.
184. See infra text accompanying notes 209-15.
185. The Supreme Court's lack of continuity in the area of federal Native American law
makes it extremely difficult to predict the future course of the trust doctrine, but continued
writing and theorizing in the area will, perhaps, make an impression upon Congress and the
courts. See Frickey, supra note 9, at 1213 (the Court's decisions display unpredictability and
inconsistency).
186. See, e.g., Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) (recover
funds from land wrongfully appropriated); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286
(1942) (funds paid in exchange for land); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923) (cancel
land patent issued by government to private third parties because the natives possessed aborigi-
nal title over lands involved); Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919) (preventing
tribal lands from being listed as public stock); see also F. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 1172-79.
187. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 249-64.
188. See 2 W. WASHBURN, supra note 119, at 941 (native political organization rooted in
the land).
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they held communally as a tribe.' 89 Consequently, tribal power and land
holdings were inextricably tied together. Furthermore, Native Americans
depended on the land for their daily existence.' 90 Most tribes depended on
the fertility of the land for survival, whether they were agrarian or
hunters. 191
B. Hunting and Fishing Rights
In several cases, Native Americans successfully defended tribal hunting
and fishing rights through invocation of the trust doctrine.' 92 In each case,
the courts evaluated the terms of the original treaties to determine whether
the agreements preserved hunting and fishing rights. 13 In Menominee Tribe
v. United States, ' the Supreme Court broadly construed the terms of the
Wolf River Treaty' 95 to encompass hunting and fishing rights.' 96 Although
the treaty referred to neither right specifically,'9 7 the Court reasoned that
Native American culture and existence included hunting and fishing.' 98 The
Court then looked to the federal obligation to "supervise" the tribes as the
source of the Federal Government's obligation to ensure the tribe uninter-
rupted exercise of their rights. 9 9 Thus, although the Wolf River Treaty did
not specifically ensure the right to hunt and fish, the Court liberally con-
strued the treaty in Menominee Tribe in favor of the tribe.2" In doing so,
the Court implicitly expanded the scope of the trust doctrine, although the
Court did not indicate whether it would do so in the absence of a treaty on
which to base its broad reading.2"'
189. See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 128.
190. See 2 W. WASHBURN, supra note 119, at 941.
191. See ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 2, at 530-35 (discussion of regional differences be-
tween native North American religions and cultures).
192. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (hunting and fishing
rights); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974) (hunting rights); Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972) (fishing rights); Leech Lake Band of
Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Minn. 1971) (hunting and fishing rights).
193. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 405-06; White, 508 F.2d at 475 n.5; Leech Lake, 334 F.
Supp. at 1003.
194. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
195. 10 Stat. 1064 (1854).
196. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 405-06.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 406.
199. Id. at 413 (federal obligations towards Indians).
200. Id. at 405-06.
201. That the Court implicitly expanded the scope of the doctrine follows inversely from its
failure to discuss any limits on or alternative grounds for its decision. See Menominee Tribe,




In addition to protecting native tribe rights to hunt and fish, courts also
protected water levels in tribal lakes through the trust relationship.2"2 In
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton,"'3 the tribal lake provided the Paiute
Tribe with its principal source of food and livelihood." In addition, the
Tribe inhabited the shores of and the area surrounding the lake.2"5 The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia relied upon a pre-
vious memorandum decision of the Supreme Court that established the gov-
ernment's initial obligation to maintain the lake and its feeder river "as a
natural spawning ground for fish and other purposes beneficial to and satis-
fying the needs of the [Paiute] Tribe."20 6 Faced with the Secretary of Inte-
rior's assertion that he made a "judgment call" as to the allocation of
water,20 v the district court, through the trust doctrine, imposed a broad duty
on the government to accommodate Native American interests, despite the
government's competing interest of supplying water to a nearby irrigation
district.2 0 8 Accordingly, the Paiutes secured the right to initial maintenance
of their tribal lake.20 9 The court's holding necessarily implies that such ini-
tial maintenance constitutes an essential need of the tribe.21 0
202. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 254-55 (D.D.C. 1973). But
see Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983) (Supreme Court refused, on the grounds of
res judicata, to reopen decree in order to expand amount of water to which Paiute Tribe is
entitled). For a full discussion of Nevada, see infra note 210.
203. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
204. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 254; see also F. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 1179-83.
205. Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 254.
206. Id. at 255.
207. Id. at 256.
208. Id. The court did not go so far as to require the government to maintain the lake's
water level at the expense of all other interests. The court only required the government to
broadly construe its obligations to the tribe and to reassess its plan in light of the resulting
obligations. Id.
209. Id. at 256-57; see also W. CANBY, supra note 9, at 41-42.
210. This inference follows because the court relied on a Supreme Court holding which
looked to similar language to impose a duty of maintenance on the government. See Pyramid
Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 254-55. This follows simply by examining the types of rights secured
through the trust doctrine. See W. CANBY, supra note 9, at 37-43 (discussing the different
rights historically secured through the trust doctrine).
The Supreme Court's decision in Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), lessens
Pyramid Lake's impact with respect of continued maintenance of tribal waters. In Nevada, the
Court held that, based on principles of resjudicata and the unique nature of riparian rights
litigation, it would not reopen past water decrees. Id. at 143. In addition, the Court also said
in dictum that when a government official is charged with two conflicting duties, the fiduciary
duty owed Native Americans under the trust doctrine and a duty to the general public, the
trust doctrine's duty must yield to that owed the general public. Id. at 141-42.
But, for several reasons, Nevada need not completely destroy the trust doctrine's applicabil-
ity to water rights cases. First, Nevada applies to the reopening of previous decrees. Id. at
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
D. Rights of Cultural Importance
In addition to representing the proposition that the trust doctrine secures
to native tribes hunting and fishing rights, Menominee Tribe v. United
States 21 demonstrates that the trust doctrine secures rights of cultural im-
portance as well. In Menominee Tribe, although the Court relied on the
trust doctrine to secure hunting and fishing rights to the Tribe, it did so
through a broad interpretation of the Wolf River Treaty. z12 The Court rea-
soned that the Treaty secured the Menominee "their way of life"'2 13 and that
their way of life necessarily included the right to hunt and fish. 214 Likewise,
in United States v. White,2 1 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit found that certain rights constituted such an integral part of
Native American life that they need not be specifically mentioned in a treaty
143. Pyramid Lake's reasoning should continue to apply to first-time litigation. See Note,
Water Rights: Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust After Nevada v. United States, 13 AM. IN-
DIAN L. REV. 79, 95 (1986).
Second, it is not always the case that one government official administers both the govern-
ment's fiduciary obligation owed Native Americans and the duty owed the public. For exam-
ple, the Secretary of the Interior, as head of the department which houses the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, discharges the government's fiduciary duty under the trust doctrine. W. CANBY, supra
note 9, at 43-46. But not all sacred sites are located in National Parks. Some sites are located
within the National Forests which fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agricul-
ture. 16 U.S.C. § 521a (1982). Thus, one government official is not always administering two
conflicting duties. In order to permanently avoid the situation where the Secretary of the
Interior is charged with two conflicting duties, Congress should adopt former President
Nixon's request for an "Indian trust counsel" to represent native interests in front of govern-
ment officials. See U.S. Lax on Protecting Indian Rights, Panel Told, Wash. Post, Jan. 31,
1989, at A4, col. 1.
Finally, the proposition that a government official, namely the Secretary of the Interior, may
face a situation where two duties conflict is inherent in the government's role as trustee for
both the public and Native Americans. Until Congress abrogates the trust relationship be-
tween Native American tribes and the government, federal courts must refrain from judicially
abrogating the relationship. Absent a clear statutory command from Congress to a govern-
ment official to act, courts must not judicially subjugate the trust doctrine's fiduciary duties.
211. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
212. Id. at 405-06.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974). The narrow holding of this case, that Native Ameri-
cans' right to hunt eagles was not abrogated by Congress, has essentially been overruled by
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). However, Dion involved hunting of eagles for
commercial purposes. Id. at 735-36. The Court specifically reserved the right of the Secretary
of the Interior to grant permits to individual Natives to hunt eagles for other purposes, includ-
ing religious. Id. at 743-45. In addition, the Court only considered whether the federal stat-
utes protecting eagles abrogated such treaty rights. Id. at 745-46. The Court did not concern
itself with how or whether such rights constituted rights secured through treaty, or otherwise,
to the tribe. See generally id. (Court fails to discuss how such treaty rights were secured
originally). Thus, White's broad reasoning is still valid.
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for a court to find such rights reserved.216 Thus, through the trust doctrine,
Native Americans can secure rights of cultural significance as well as posses-
sory land rights.
Native Americans have successfully employed the trust doctrine to secure
several rights essential to their physical survival2 7 and their culture.21 8 The
trust doctrine has formed the basis for protecting tribal lands2 19 and secur-
ing funds generated from the land.22 ° The courts have also applied the trust
doctrine to preserve Native Americans' continued hunting and fishing
rights,2 2 ' whether such rights constituted native cultural heritage or were
specifically reserved through treaty.2 22 The trust doctrine has also afforded
initial maintenance of the water level of a tribal lake. 223 Accordingly, fed-
eral courts have used the trust doctrine as a means by which to impose on
the government the obligation of protecting the basic needs of the Native
American tribes.224
216. White, 508 F.2d at 457. After noting that early treaties did not reserve hunting and
fishing rights the court stated: "The right to hunt and fish was part of the larger rights pos-
sessed by the Indians in the lands used and occupied by them. Such right, which was 'not
much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed,' re-
mained in them unless granted away." Id. (citation omitted).
217. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 406-07 n.2 (hunting and fishing rights); White,
508 F.2d at 457 (hunting rights); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 254
(D.D.C. 1972) (fishing rights); Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp.
1001, 1006 (D. Minn. 1971) (hunting and fishing rights).
218. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 406 (hunting and fishing rights constituted
part of native lifestyle at the time the Wolf River Treaty was negotiated); White, 508 F.2d at
457 (use of hunted eagles in religious rituals is an integral part of native life such that the tribe
would assume that any treaty secured such a right).
219. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 236 (1922) (Court cancelled a land
patent issued by government to a private third party based on the Native Americans' posses-
sory title); Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 114 (1918) (preventing tribal lands
from being placed on public stock listing).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (compensation granted
for lands secured to the Sioux through treaty and later taken by the United States); Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942) (funds paid in exchange for land).
221. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 404 (hunting and fishing rights); White, 508
F.2d at 457 (hunting rights); Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 258 (fishing rights); Leech Lake
Band, 334 F. Supp. at 1006 (hunting and fishing rights).
222. Supra text accompanying notes 211-20.
223. See Pyramid Lake, 354 F. Supp. at 258. But see Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S.
110 (1982) (Court refused to reopen a previously issued water decree, despite the Secretary of
Interior's fiduciary duty owed the Paiute, based on grounds of resjudicata); see supra note 210.
224. See F. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 1165-70.
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IV. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE: ENCOMPASSING
ESSENTIAL AND CULTURAL POSSESSORY LAND RIGHTS BASED
ON NATIVE AMERICANS' SUBJECTIVE
DETERMINATIONS
The unique relationship of Native American tribes with the United
States225 gives rise to legally enforceable duties incumbent upon the govern-
ment to uphold.22 6 Chief Justice Marshall originally characterized the trust
relationship in the Cherokee cases227 and relied on the natives' status as "do-
mestic dependent nation[s]'  to conclude that the Federal Government
owed an obligation of protection to the Native American tribes. 229 The obli-
gation imposed upon the Federal Government by the Cherokee cases served
as a basis for federal preemption of state activity in the area of tribal sover-
eignty. 23° The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the United States,
as the stronger nation, could eliminate all vestiges of the weaker native na-
tion's sovereignty.231 Hence, it originally appeared that the Court linked the
concept of legally enforceable duties to protect the Native Americans' sepa-
rate identity to the tribes' status as domestic sovereigns.
232
At the turn of the century, the Court permitted Congress to pursue and
exercise heavily paternalistic policies towards Native American affairs. De-
cisions such as United States v. Kagama 233 and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock 
234
allowed Congress to implement, virtually unchecked, policies designed to
destroy the Native American tribal system. In 1980, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Sioux Nation,235 reversed those decisions and in doing so,
implicitly rejected Congress' ability to act paternalistically on behalf of Na-
tive Americans.
The Court's decision in Sioux Nation makes it possible for Native Ameri-
cans to assert their valuations of their interests. It indicates the Court's
willingness to disturb congressional determinations of Native American in-
terests if the surrounding historical circumstances do not reasonably support
225. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
226. Though the Supreme Court has curbed Native Americans' ability to sue for monetary
damages, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538-40 (1980), the question of equitable
relief remains open. See Newton, supra note 175, at 678-80.
227. See supra note 41.
228. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
229. Id. at 17-20.
230. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552, 555-56, 561-62 (1832), overruled
on other grounds, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
231. Id. at 550-51.
232. See id.
233. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
234. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
235. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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congressional findings.2 36 Rejecting government paternalism grants Native
Americans a participatory role in asserting and determining interests that
warrant federal protection.23 7 Although the fiduciary obligation remains
necessary to insure government protection of Native American interests, the
fiduciary duty does not justify government's determination of those interests
absent any input from tribal representatives.238
By rejecting Congress' paternalistic practices, the Court effectively elimi-
nated the judiciary's ability to practice paternalism. The same reasoning
that precludes paternalistic congressional and executive appraisals of Native
Americans' best interests, precludes similar judicial appraisals as well. Sub-
stituting a federal court's judgment for that advanced by the native tribe
eliminates the effect of Sioux Nation, and results in judicial paternalism.
Thus, federal courts, when faced with suits brought under the trust doctrine,
should accept as legitimate the interests advanced by the native tribe.239
Historically, the trust doctrine secured Native American tribes' essential
material needs. 24° Courts generally protected the natives' right to their
land,2 4 ' their right to hunt and fish,24 2 and their right to protect their tribal
236. Id. at 413-14.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
238. See generally Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 371 (rejection of plenary power of Congress).
239. The contrary position, that courts protect the Native Americans' essential needs as
seen from western culture's perspective, does not withstand scrutiny. See, e.g, Sioux Nation
448 U.S. at 414 (congressional actions which damage native rights are actionable). Formal
education arguably reflects "white America's" assessment of what is "best for the Native
American." See F. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 687. This is not to understate the value Native
Americans place on education. The difference between their interest in hunting and education,
for example, is that hunting is viewed as an aboriginal right. See Leech Lake Band of Chip-
pewa Indians v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (D. Minn. 1971). Formal education, on the
other hand, was not seriously introduced to Native Americans until the missionaries went out
among the tribes in the late eighteenth century in an attempt to educate the Native Americans.
F. PRUCHA, supra note 66, at 690. When the reformers did begin to educate the natives, the
studies were limited to those subjects considered important to the missionaries. Id. at 690-92.
In addition, systematic refusal to acknowledge the natives' self-assessment of their interests
reflects the logic of Lone Wolf and Kagama because it essentially shifts the power to the
federal government to decide which Native American interests warrant protection. The
Supreme Court flatly rejected this position several years ago. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at
412-13.
The Court's Sioux Nation decision indicates its willingness to examine Congress' determina-
tions of the Native Americans' best interests in light of surrounding historical circumstances.
Id. Together, the Court's willingness to review state actions and the limits placed on federal
government activities, allow Native Americans enough judicial review to effectively assert their
interests in a judicial forum.
240. See W. CANBY, supra note 9, at 37-43.
241. See cases cited supra note 186.
242. See cases cited supra note 192. But see United states v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986)
(Congress can abrogate hunting rights secured through treaty).
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assets.243 In doing so, courts have construed the terms of treaties broadly to
include rights that constitute an integral part of native culture and sur-
vival.2 44 In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit 245 construed the Non-Intercourse Act 24 6 broadly and concluded that it
created a general trust relationship between the Federal Government and all
native tribes, regardless of whether a specific treaty exists which creates such
a relationship. 24 7 Therefore, it appears that government action that ad-
versely affects Native Americans' basic needs violates the government's fidu-
ciary duty owed Native Americans.
Analysis of the rights and interests protected by the trust doctrine raises
the question of whether the doctrine would also encompass protection of a
tribe's intangible and spiritual needs.248 So long as those needs rise to the
level of needs essential to the tribe's continued existence, the trust doctrine
should also protect those needs.
A. Extending the Trust Doctrine to Protect Sacred Sites
Native Americans' essential needs entail more than just the material needs
of land, food, water, and protection of tribal assets. Native Americans be-
lieve their future depends on their sustained communication with the spirit
world, communication possible only at sacred sites.249 Religion pervades
every aspect of Native American lives and makes natives unable to compart-
mentalize their lifestyles into distinct religious and secular components. 5 '
Native American tribes generally practice site-specific religion,25' wor-
shiping the geographical location where a particular event occurred rather
than praising the event itself.252 Native Americans worship sacred sites
because of their belief in the particular site's importance to the spirit
243. See, e.g., Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 371 (grant compensation for lands secured through
treaty and later taken by government); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942)
(funds paid in exchange for land).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 210-16.
245. Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.
1975).
246. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982).
247. Passamaquoddy, 528 F.2d at 379.
248. Several scholars have noted and explored the possibility of extending the trust doc-
trine's applicability in the future to encompass other interests not traditionally protected. See
W. CANBY, supra note 9, at 42-43; Chambers, supra note 9, at 1225; Clinton, Isolated in Their
Own Country: A Defense of Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 979 (1981); see also Note, supra note 28.
249. See supra note 2.
250. See Michaelson, American Indian Religious Freedom Litigation: Promises and Perils,
3 J. L. & RELIGION 47, 49-50 (1986).
251. Id.
252. Id.; see also supra note 2.
[Vol. 38:705
The Trust Doctrine
world.2 53 Depending on the site, the natives may believe it is the origin of
the world, of life in general, or of the spirit of the tribe or a particular indi-
vidual.2 54 Similarly, tribes may worship the site because of the force they
believe it exerts over a tribe member's hunting skills, or ability to communi-
cate, or general day-to-day existence.255 Although native indigenous reli-
gions are numerous and diverse, sacred sites are universally indispensable to
Native American religion and thus essential to the natives' continued cul-
tural existence.2 56
B. Comment
The trust doctrine should encompass protection for Native American sa-
cred sites.257 Typically, courts apply the doctrine to protect rights secured
through treaties, statutes, or agreements. 25  Courts have displayed a willing-
ness to broadly construe the relevant terms of these legal documents.
259
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized the primacy of Native Ameri-
can notions of their basic needs, rather than the Federal Government's per-
ceptions. 2 ' ° Therefore, based on the importance placed on sacred sites in
Native American culture, the trust doctrine's analysis should extend to curb
government action that adversely impacts on Native American sacred sites.
Regardless of how irrational the natives' religious beliefs may appear to a
federal court, the importance of the site to the natives constitutes the only
relevant consideration. Because Sioux Nation requires courts to accept the
tribe's assessment of their best interests, courts should accept the assertion
that sacred sites are indispensable to Native Americans' future existence.
Not only do Native Americans believe the sites ensure their material exist-
253. See supra note 2; see also Michaelson, supra note 250, at 47-50.
254. See supra note 2.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982),
arguably could create a claim to protect sacred sites, but the Supreme Court construed the
statute otherwise. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1328
(1988). The Supreme Court held that AIRFA does not create a cause of action for Native
American plaintiffs. Id. at 1328; see also 98 CONG. REC. 21,443, 21,445 (1978) (Cong. Udall
stated, "[This Act] has no teeth in it."). Nevertheless, AIRFA does acknowledge the impor-
tance of religion.
258. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225-26 (1983) (determining that
trust relation arose from statutes and regulations); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S.
371, 415 (treaty creates trust relationship); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 296-97
(1942) (same); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923) (same).
259. Chief Justice Marshall employed phrases such as "a home to be held as Indian lands
are held." Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405-06 (1968); see supra notes
190-99, 209-214 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 239.
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ence, they also believe their worship provides the tribe with vitality and
secures the continued existence of the world.2 6' To Native Americans, these
sacred sites are as essential as food and shelter.2 62 In fact, they believe that
without the sites, they would lose their ability to hunt, and thus would sur-
render their future existence.2 63 Therefore, it is possible that Native Ameri-
cans view their sacred sites as their most important tribal asset. The
reasoning behind trust doctrine precedent2 64 amply supports the assertion
that courts should accept these characterizations and include sacred sites
within the realm of trust doctrine protection.
Including sacred sites within the trust doctrine is also consistent with the
dicta of prior cases. For example, in Menominee Tribe v. United States
26 5
the Court broadly construed the clause "a home to be held as [Native Amer-
ican] lands are held,''266 to include hunting and fishing rights within the
rights secured by the treaty.2 67 In light of both the importance placed on
sacred sites in native culture and the inseparability of secular and spiritual
concepts in native life, Native Americans should have an inherent right to
undisturbed use of the sacred sites.26 8 Therefore, extending the trust doc-
trine to protect sacred sites is consistent with values deemed important to
Native Americans by the Supreme Court.
The trust doctrine should protect Native Americans' spiritual as well as
material needs. This type of protection is sufficiently similar to protecting
the material needs that previously warranted defense from government en-
croachment. Native American religious needs rise to the same level of im-
portance in native culture as the right and ability to hunt and fish. 2 69 In
addition, the courts have expressed the importance of preserving a tribe's
cultural identity. Extending the trust doctrine to encompass sacred sites
achieves cultural protection of Native American tribes. In fact, limiting
trust protection to only material needs eventually will result in the loss of
Native American culture because of the importance of sacred site worship to
individual and tribal survival. Thus, extension of the trust doctrine is consis-
261. See supra note 2; see also Michaelson, supra note 250, at 47-50.
262. See generally supra note 2 (discussion of indispensability of sacred sites generally to
the lives of Native Americans).
263. Id.
264. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
265. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
266. Id. at 405-06.
267. Id. at 406; see also supra text accompanying notes 190-99.
268. In addition, this protection must extend to sites both on and off reservation land. See
supra note 11.
269. See supra note 2.
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tent with, and necessary to protect the values encompassed by the trust
doctrine.
C. The Compelling State Interest Test.: Accommodating Native American
and Government Interests
The government's fiduciary duty compels it to protect Native American
interests. The government, however, also faces a competing duty owed to all
the nation's citizens. Blind deference to the trust doctrine will compromise
the government's competing duty owed the general public whenever the two
duties clash. Applying the compelling state interest test27° will effectively
accommodate both the government's interest in managing its National Park
and Forest land27" ' and the Native Americans' interest in maintaining the
integrity of their sacred sites. Through legislation,272 Congress has acknowl-
edged the importance of Native American religion to the future existence of
native culture. 27 3 Given the existence of such legislation, and the trust obli-
gation the government owes Native Americans, courts should enjoin govern-
ment action which negatively affects a sacred site, absent a congressional
mandate requiring affirmative interference with a sacred site.274 This ap-
proach allows for the execution of Congress' laws but precludes discretion-
ary acts by government officials not ordered by Congress. It also provides
courts with evidence of a determination by Congress that the importance of
the required action outweighs the government's trust responsibility. This
approach frees federal judges from balancing the two competing interests
while still affording the government the necessary latitude to function.
270. See supra note 6.
271. Native Americans assert hunting and fishing rights off the reservation because many
of the traditional hunting and fishing areas are not located on the reservation. See supra note
11. Therefore, logically, when those sites are not located on the reservation, the protection of
sacred sites must also extend off the reservation. See 1982 HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 228
(numerous sacred sites are located off the reservation).
272. AIRFA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982) (codifying United States' policy to protect and pre-
serve sacred sites).
273. Id.
274. Congress had never directed the Department of the Interior to build the Gasquet-
Orleans (G-0) road, the government action which spawned Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1321-22 (1988). In fact, the Forest Service originally
decided not to build the road because of the adverse impact the road would have on the nearby
sacred sites. Id. at 1322. Once the Forest Service reversed its decision, in an effort to protect
the surrounding area, Congress passed the California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-425,
98 Stat. 1619 (1984) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. IV 1986)). In the Wilderness Act.
Congress declared the affected land a wilderness area, thus making all commercial activity
illegal, including logging. Congress excepted from wilderness designation a small strip of land
previously set aside for the G-O road. Id. Thus, it appears that Congress did everything short
of passing a law forbidding the Secretary of Agriculture to act.
1989]
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V. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lyng, Native Ameri-
cans can no longer look to the first amendment for protection of their sacred
sites. Yet the importance of these sites to native culture, and perhaps actual
survival, mandates that Native Americans look for alternative legal grounds
through which to secure the integrity of sacred sites. The trust doctrine
presents such a possibility. The trust doctrine imposes a duty on the govern-
ment to protect a tribe's basic needs. In the past, the courts have only dealt
with basic material needs, but federal courts now construe these needs
through the Native Americans' own assessment of importance. Because reli-
gion, to which sacred sites are essential, is also a basic need of the Native
American, the trust doctrine should encompass protection of sacred sites.
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